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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TRIBALISM, POLITICAL REALISM DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Apr-9 May 82 pp 16-17

[Article by E. Kalambay: "Tribalism and Political Reality in Black Africa"]

[Text] "Independent" Africa is going through a crisis in the excessively nationalistic [*nationalitaire*] consciousness whose roots are found in tribalism.

With all its ideological connotations, the term "tribalism" is often used to explain the struggle between different factions for the highest office in the land. Before approaching this subject, it is important to give a brief redefinition of the concept of tribe based on historical facts.

The concept of tribe bears the hallmark of Western civilization and describes a specific form of social organization and Indo-European policy. "The Indo-European tribe designates the broadest type of social organization that existed before the apparition of the city state. It included basic political units on a small scale: the *genos* (*yevos*) and the *phrata* among the Greeks and the *gens* and the *curia* among the Latins. Maurice Godelier¹ emphasizes that the essential thing here is to note that all these terms (except for *curia*) belong both to the vocabulary of consanguinity and the vocabulary of politics, which presumes a real or presumed internal relationship between consanguinity and political organization. "In this sense, the concept of tribe fits into Indo-European political and social realities as a fact of their experience, an element of observation."¹

It is not yet a "catchall" concept, as it would later become, particularly in the mid 19th century, when anthropology, by a sleight-of-hand trick, became a scientific discipline. Actually, an acrobatic discourse on the "Other" (primitive) can in no way be called scientific. The 19th century, which is the century of historical discontinuity for Black Africa (1885), would also be the century of the prostitution of terms such as tribe, clan, ethnic group, and so on. Anthropologists, including the ethnologists, administrators, missionaries and all other colonists trading in shoddy goods would use the terms of tribe, clan, and so on, to designate historical configurations in Black Africa.

This was the situation when Morgan undertook a study of the "tribal" social organization in his book "Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human

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Family" (Washington, 1871). In it, Morgan shows that the social relationships that dominated the organization of most primitive societies were those of consanguinity. These relationships of consanguinity had an internal logic that had to be sought in the detailed study of rules of marriage and the terminologies of consanguinity, rules and terms that generally seemed lacking in any logic, in the eyes of Europeans confused by the systems of "classifying" consanguinity found in Africa, Asia, Oceania and America. Morgan arrived at the explanation that systems of consanguinity have a history and have followed one another in a necessary order since man progressed from the animal state and the sexual promiscuity of the primitive hordes and that little by little, there developed a ban on incest and marriage between increasingly broad categories of persons related by blood. According to Morgan, the "human family" evolved from the primitive form of "group marriage," which has now completely disappeared, to the monogamy of the European nuclear families.²

After this highly debatable clarification, Morgan defines the tribe as a "completely organized society," a form of social organization capable of reproducing itself. "It illustrates the condition of mankind which had emerged from primitive bestiality but which had not yet reached the stage of civilization, of the political 'society' of the state." Civilization makes its appearance with the state, through the disintegration of the "gentle" society coming after the appearance and development of private ownership of herds and the land, and the illegal accumulation of this private wealth goes hand in hand with the consolidation of the monogamous family.

After this historical review, it is important to present in a few lines what I would call the dynamic of tribal policy in precolonial Black Africa. I wished to clarify the concept of tribe, for inasmuch as it is of foreign origin, it naturally takes on a different nuance in Black Africa, which greatly risks distorting our own realities and invalidating our theoretical analyses if there is not absolute precision or no precision at all.

Dynamic of Tribal Policy in Precolonial Black Africa

In his book "Tribalism and the Single Party in Black Africa," Lancine-Sylla defines tribalism, on page 23, as "a given social milieu, a system of attractions and repulsion between the members or two or more groups making up that social milieu. The members of each of these groups claim to be linked by blood, but they are much more linked by the idea they have of themselves with respect to others. Consequently, tribalism is a group mentality, a gregarious illusion or a state of mind that determines the conduct of individuals belonging to the same group and that rules their often aggressive relationships with the members of similar groups. This group, which exists in opposition to others and whose members believe to be linked by blood, is the tribe, whence the word 'tribalism.' This suffix 'ism' denotes the idea or ideology that the members of the group in question have of themselves. In precolonial Africa, tribalism is confused with patriotism or nationalism."³

It is in fact a question of a system of social regulation, self-defense and of maintaining the equilibrium of the group. Black Africa has known a variety of societies which Morgan calls "basic social units." Some of them were made

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up of multiple political units, while others were unified under a single state, in other words, the state which, according to Morgan, presumes the disintegration of the "gentle" society.

In Black Africa, one finds the basic social or tribal units, which in the state (kingdom) retain a certain autonomy. The situation of these political units changed at the time of colonization.

Colonial Tribalism and Its Consequences

Tribalism as a factor of divisions and the exclusion of the "other" began with foreign penetration. From the 7th to the 15th and 16th centuries, the Muslim Arabs occupied certain parts of Africa before being replaced by the Europeans in the 15th to 16th century. The expansion of Islam was particularly expressed by the destruction of the great empires that were the Soninke Empire in Ghana, the Mandingo Empire in Mali and the Songhai Empire of Kaw Kaw in the case of western Sudan.

Most researchers recognize that by this period in history, human societies had evolved as follows: families, lineages, clans, tribes, kingdoms and empires. From that time on, looting and even the destruction of African kingdoms and empires would lead to what the GERC [Congo Study Group]⁴ calls "retribalization," or the blockage of the normal process of evolution toward the nation, in which family, lineal, clan and tribal solidarities became secondary. When, in the 15th to 16th century, Europe renewed its relations with Africa, these contacts first of all involved the introduction of Christianity and the trading of products (the minority of leaders with the monopoly over commercial relations procured guns in exchange for slaves). Like Islam, Christianity would constitute just one more factor among the elements of division.

The history of the kingdom of Kongo is significant. The alliance with the Portuguese, renewed because of the need of the Whites for Blacks and those of the minority of leaders for imported products, would lead to the abolition and even the destruction-reestablishment of the great empires, kingdoms and chiefdoms and consequently, to the retribalization of the different populations. The Berlin conference (1884-1885) confirmed the Balkanization of Africa and the end of sovereignty. In the face of this situation, family, lineal, clan and tribal solidarities would be strengthened and constitute the means of preventing the physical disappearance of members of the family. Slavery and the man-hunts that went with it had as their effect the destruction of order and of the stability of African states or empires. Furthermore, the policy of the slavetraders, replaced by that of the colonialists, was based on alliances with certain tribes or certain states against others. This policy resulted in the blocking of the advent of national consciousness, to the benefit of lineal, clan and tribal solidarities.⁵

Patent facts of history show how the colonist played off the kings and regions one against the other, emphasizing first the virtues of one and the faults of the "other." In observing the situation in colonial Algeria, Fanon writes that "the White man, unable to meet all demands, rid himself of the responsibilities. I would call this process the racial distribution of culpability,"

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he writes ("Peaux Noires, Masques Blancs," Editions du Seuil, 1952, page 103). In Zaire, this process of the racial distribution of culpability developed as follows: In Western Kasai, the colonists would tell the people emigrating from Eastern Kasai the following: "You are intelligent, you love work and you are not like the Lulua, who do not want to work and who prefer rebellion." The result of this policy was massacres among the two brother peoples. In Katanga, the same spectacle of horror took place between what the colonists called the "authentic" Katangans (Conakat) and the Balubakat group.

With the coming of fictitious independence, we witness the emergence of a singularly impoverished "thought," limited to last-minute tribal coordinates. Those of the "state chiefs" that were imposed on the local populations by the obscure powers organized their power around a tribal "clientele." The new masters undertook to divide once again the people once united by common suffering. The tribal solidarities that were thought to have been stifled by the fight against colonialism regained unexpected strength. People were named to posts of responsibility because of their tribal affiliations. Leaders surrounded themselves with a court made up of the family, close relatives and a few faithful allies chosen because of their degree of complacency.

Postcolonial Tribalism

Tribalism then became a mechanism for the redistribution of power and the advantages it confers. Within a single country, one can distinguish a category of "others" to which those who hold power do not belong.

The preconceived idea of "otherness," which during colonial times functioned as a screen between the White settler and the Blacks, becomes the line of division between those Blacks who replaced the colonist in power and those from other regions who are excluded from the state machinery and the distribution of related privileges. However, it is important to note that tribal feeling as used in Africa today has nothing to do with that deeper tribal feeling which the individual had for his family or lineal group.

Tribal solidarity as exploited after independence had as its essential purpose to strangle any form of unified political organization against the new forms of exploitation to which the masses would be condemned.

The Zairian case can serve as an example to illustrate our remarks. The current regime, in power since 1965, has taken measures which, far from eradicating narrow group interests (tribalism), only help to maintain them. This is the case of the quota rule, among others, a rule that sets by region and ethnic group the number of posts available in government jobs and higher education. This is also the case of the spirit in keeping with which the provincial governor must be from another province. The result of this practice is particularly sad. One often sees that when the governors leave their posts, they leave their places of work in a pitiful state. Some take pleasure in even taking light bulbs and switches from their residences with them. It is therefore futile to ask them to help in any way the regions that are their responsibility and that are totally foreign to them.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Maurice Godelier: "Horizon, Trajets Marxistes en Anthropologie," Francois Maspero: "Petite Collection Maspero," Paris, 1977 (page 192).
2. Ibid., pages 193-194.
3. Lancine-Sylla: "Tribalisme et Parti Unique en Afrique Noire," Editions Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris 1977.
4. GERC: Congo Study Group (Groupe d'Etudes des Realites Congolaises).
5. In this paragraph, we based our remarks mainly on the GERC article published in PEUPLES NOIRS, PEUPLES AFRICAINS, No 18, November-December 1980, pages 34-35.

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SOUTH KOREA'S ECONOMY, ACTIVITY IN AFRICA, REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 pp 892-895

[Text] Until 1979, South Korea experienced spectacular economic development: the GNP increased by an average of 10 percent a year from 1970 to 1980, and some targets of the 1977-1981 Five-Year Plan were achieved in 2 years. That country had thus become a genuine modern industrial power, making effective use of its labor, and having a good supervisory staff. However, in 1979 and particularly in 1980, Korea's growth slowed because of numerous economic and political difficulties. In 1980, for the first time, it had a negative rate of economic growth: 5.7 percent. This situation did not continue, however, because South Korea changed its policy, and the positive results of the reforms appeared in 1981. It is estimated that the rate of growth in the GNP will be 7.1 percent in 1981. Moreover, inflation stabilized in 1981.

French-Korean trade relations have been characterized by major contracts. However, indications are that the development of Korean industry will convince that country to handle the supervision of projects itself, and that the major projects will gradually give way to individual sales of capital goods. In order to develop a better understanding of Korea and of French opportunities for trade with Korea, the French Center for Foreign Trade on 18 March organized an information day in Paris led by Jean-Marc Bernard, commercial counselor in the French Embassy in Seoul.

For our part, in order to provide information on Korea's economic relations with Africa, we are presenting a previously unpublished survey to inform both Africa and Europe about what Korea exports and obtains, and by what means, in an increasing number of African countries, and to explain the features of South Korean development.

All of South Korea's policy is motivated by two main considerations: to counter everywhere the efforts of North Korea, and to develop exports at all costs.

The Seoul government certainly could not ignore the African continent, and over some 15 years of enterprising efforts it has built up a remarkable position. It has developed interests which, though not yet substantial, nevertheless occupy a not insignificant place in Korea's policy, economy, and planning.

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The South Korean Economy: Growth and Vitality

By way of introduction, it should be recalled that the country's economy has shown astounding growth and vitality during the past 25 years. The following are the main statistics.

In 1953, just prior to the war that devastated it, South Korea was in a state of absolute poverty, which was even more disturbing since the southern part of the peninsula is devoid of any significant natural wealth, and particularly any energy resources.

With an area of 98,807 sq km, comparable to the Netherlands, Iceland, and Portugal, South Korea today has a population of 38 million, or 384 per sq km, making it one of the most densely populated countries in the world. The growth rate is 1.6 percent. The urban population now totals 57.2 percent of the total, with 42.8 percent still in the rural areas. The city of Seoul alone has 8.5 million people, or 22.36 percent of the total population.

The working population is about 14.5 million, of whom 34.2 percent are in agriculture, 21.3 percent in mining and industry, and 44.5 percent in services and other activities relating to industry as well as in the tertiary sector as a whole. One should also be aware that Korean emigration is significant: 700,000 Koreans live in Japan, and 650,000 in the United States--this figure will probably exceed a million at the end of the century.

The population is relatively young: 59 percent of Koreans are under 25. The people are active, enterprising, and accustomed to hardship. Their exceptional dynamism is in fact the only real resource of South Korea, a preeminently human resource.

Using 1953, the end of the war, as the zero index--the standard of living at that time being comparable to that of Chad--Korea today (1981) has a GNP estimated at U.S. \$61 billion (\$1 = 710 won; Fr 1 = 120 won), or a per capital annual income of \$1,636. It was \$532 in 1975, and so it has more than tripled in 6 years. It will probably be \$1,870 at the end of 1982 (\$280 in China; \$140 in Mali).¹

In 1981, exports totaled \$21 billion and imports \$26.3 billion (more than double the trade of the PRC).² This compares with exports worth \$6 billion in 1975 and \$1 billion in 1970. The rate of growth of the economy was 7 percent in 1981, compared to 14.2 percent in 1976, 10.5 percent in 1977, and 11.6 percent in 1978.

Korea's main trading partners are the United States and Japan. In 1981, 26.5 percent of Korean exports went to the United States, and 16.4 percent to Japan. In the same year, 26.3 percent of imports came from Japan, and 21.9 percent from the United States.

In more general categories (1981), 31 percent of Korean exports went to Asian countries (of this, 16.4 percent to Japan), 28.8 percent to North America (of which 26.5 percent went to the United States), 16.2 percent to Europe, of which

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12.8 percent went to the Community countries (1.7 percent to France), 15.3 percent to the Middle East, 3.2 percent to Latin America, 2.8 percent, \$580 million, to Africa, and 1.7 percent to Oceania.

In 1981 there was a significant rate of increase in exports to the Latin American countries, +64.2 percent; to Oceania, +27.5 percent; to Africa, +26.9 percent; to the Middle East, +26.2 percent; to North America, +22.1 percent; to Asia, +15.6 percent; and to Europe, +8.9 percent (EEC, +2.6 percent).

These exports in 1981 included: textile products, 29.5 percent, \$6.186 billion; metallurgical products, 11.2 percent, \$2.343 billion; electronic products, 10.6 percent, \$2.219 billion; naval construction, 6.7 percent, \$1.404 billion; various metallurgical products, including machine tools, 4.7 percent, \$981 million; chemical products, 2.9 percent, \$605 million; tires, 2.2 percent, \$459 million; sea products (fisheries), 2 percent, \$428 million; and plywood, 1.9 percent, \$393 million.

There was significant progress in 1981 compared to 1980 in naval construction, +127.4 percent. Textile industry exports also increased by 23.4 percent.

One noteworthy aspect of Korean exports was the construction yards, public works, and buildings in the Middle East, Libya, and Nigeria, which in 1981 earned \$3.5 billion in foreign currency.

The structure of the Korean economy is extremely concentrated, to the degree that 61.2 percent of the exports in 1981 came from 50 major companies. The principal exporters, in order of importance, are: Daewoo, which exported \$1.904 billion in 1981; Hyundai, \$1.722 billion; Samsung, \$1.607 billion; Kukje Corporation, \$846 million; Hyosung, \$786 million; Ssangyong, \$758 million; Bando Sangsa, \$622 million; Sunkyoung, \$585 million; Tongkook, \$300 million; and Hanil Synthetic, \$226 million.³

These are what in Korea is called the General Trading Companies--or chaebol in Korean--groups with diversified activities, like the Japanese zaibatsu but with the important difference that the Korean chaebol does not include a bank in the group. The banking system in Korea is very dependent on the state, which virtually controls credit and exercises a strong state-control type of role with respect to companies. The Korean economy can thus be defined as a liberal economy closely confined by the state administration.

South Korean Presence in Africa

The following is a review of the various aspects of the South Korean presence in the continent.

A) Political

Until 1975, South Korea's foreign policy toward Africa was based to some degree on reaction to North Korea's initiatives. Seoul tried to counter Pyongyang's broad efforts to penetrate the African states. Its efforts

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consisted mainly of developing policy explanations; specifically, demonstrating that North Korea's nonalignment was false, and affirming South Korea's views on reunification.

The year 1975 marked a change in South Korean diplomacy toward Africa, a policy which had previously been relatively passive. It took the form, on the administrative level, of division of the Europe-Africa-Middle East Office of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Seoul into three separate area responsibilities, one of them being Africa, which usually is headed by a high French-speaking official.

In addition to the political aspect already cited, there was also an increased awareness of the economic factors specific to Africa: the assurance of a supply of raw materials from a continent richly endowed with them, and the development of exports. Thus, Seoul gradually became knowledgeable about Africa, exploring its markets and assigning it a growing importance.

Since 1977, Korea has been engaged in a public relations campaign which has not lagged. Korean ministers have visited Black Africa, and many prominent Africans have been received officially and given VIP treatment in Seoul. Prominent examples include visits by Senegalese President Senghor in May 1979, the Equatorial Guinea foreign minister in 1980, and the foreign ministers of Liberia, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Niger in 1981.

Also, several Korean leaders have visited Africa. In November and December 1980, Foreign Affairs Minister Shinyong Lho was received in Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Ghana, and Gambia.

In January 1981, Minister of Science and Technology Lee Chung-oh visited Central Africa, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

In April, Minister of Transportation Yoon Ja Joong was received in Liberia and Nigeria. In May, Minister of Home Affairs Suh Chung Hwa visited Djibouti. In November and December, No Tae Woo, minister of state for national security and foreign affairs, paid a visit to Nigeria and Upper Volta. In November, Chun Myung Kee, minister of health and social affairs, went to Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, and Kenya.

South Korea currently has 52 embassies on the African continent, 30 of which are in Black Africa.

In North Africa: Egypt (diplomatic relations at embassy level established in December 1981), Libya (December 1980), Morocco (July 1962), and Tunisia (March 1969).

In sub-Saharan Africa, South Korea is represented in the following countries (in alphabetical order [according to the French spelling]): Botswana (April 1968), Cameroon (August 1961), Central Africa (September 1963), Comoros (February 1979), Ivory Coast (July 1961), Djibouti (December 1977), Ethiopia (December 1963), Gabon (October 1962), Gambia (April 1965), Ghana (November 1977), Guinea (January 1978), Equatorial Guinea (September 1979), Upper Volta

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(April 1962), Kenya (February 1964), Lesotho (December 1966), Liberia (January 1964), Madagascar (June 1962), Malawi (March 1965), Mauritius (July 1971), Mauritania (November 1978), Niger (July 1961), Nigeria (February 1980), Uganda (March 1963), Rwanda (March 1963), Senegal (October 1962), Sierra Leone (June 1962), Sudan (April 1977), Swaziland (November 1968), Chad (August 1961), and Zaire (April 1963).⁴

Note:

1. There are permanent resident South Korean ambassadors only in the following countries: Cameroon, Central Africa, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Upper Volta, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Uganda, and Senegal.
2. Only Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, and Swaziland recognize only the Republic of Korea, having refused to accept representatives from North Korea. The latter is, however, represented in 45 other African countries.

Only one Black African ambassador is resident in Seoul, that of Gabon. Most of the other African ambassadors accredited in Korea reside in Tokyo or in Washington.

B) Technical Assistance

Korea's technical assistance to Africa is still at a modest level. It is based on a number of agreements with African states.

Technical cooperation agreements: Central African Republic, May 1973; Gabon, July 1975; Djibouti, February 1979; Senegal, April 1979; Zaire, November 1981.

Economic and trade agreements: Niger, December 1969; Central African Republic, May 1973; Zaire, November 1973; Senegal, April 1975; Cameroon, December 1975 and August 1977; Chad, November 1977; Sierra Leone, May 1978; Upper Volta, November 1978; Cameroon, May 1979; and Liberia, May 1981.

Fishing agreements were signed with Gambia in July 1976. Others are ready for signing with Mauritania and Morocco.

South Korea has also received a considerable number of trainees during the period 1963 to 1981: 165 from 23 African countries. There are currently 24 in Korea for training who arrived during 1981: 6 from Ethiopia, 1 from Liberia, 1 from Sierra Leone, 1 from Cameroon, 1 from Ghana, 9 from Nigeria, 1 from Mauritius, 1 from Senegal, 2 from Tanzania, and 1 from Malawi. From 1963 to 1980, 29 Kenyans received training in Korea.

During the same period, 1963-1981, Korea sent 22 experts to seven black African countries, in particular Cameroon, mainly for agriculture and fisheries.

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South Korean investments in Africa have also remained at a relatively modest level. At the end of 1981, they totaled U.S. \$7,582,000--\$6,945,000 in Gabon, \$543,000 in Nigeria, \$69,000 in the Ivory Coast, and \$25,000 in Senegal.

Export credits to facilitate purchase of Korean products were larger. They reached \$145,502,000: \$100,534,000 to Nigeria, \$39,424,000 to Ghana, \$2,008,000 to Kenya (approved in 1979), \$1,881,000 to Liberia (1981), \$767,000 to Gabon (1976), and \$288,000 to Kenya (1977).

C) Grade

Korea's trade with Africa also ranks rather modestly, but is making steady progress.

In 1980, the total of exports to the whole continent was \$772.8 million, or 4.4 percent of total South Korean exports (\$17.5 billion for the same year). In 1976, this figure had been \$208 million, or 2.6 percent of total exports; in 1977 \$291 million, (2.9 percent); in 1978 \$315.4 million (2.5 percent); and in 1979 \$523.9 million (3.4 percent).

Exports to the countries of Black Africa alone were \$457 million (2.6 percent of the total) in 1980, but \$580 million (2.8 percent) in 1981, or an increase of 26.9 percent.

South Korean imports from Africa are considerably smaller. The trade balance favors Korea. In 1976, these imports totaled \$75.9 million (0.8 percent of total imports); in 1977, \$98.5 million (0.7 percent); in 1978, \$43.4 million (0.3 percent); in 1979, \$116.2 million (1 percent); and in 1980, \$171.5 million (0.8 percent).

Korea's main partners in sub-Saharan Africa in 1980 were: Nigeria receiving \$124.5 million in South Korean exports (boats, electronic equipment), but Korea importing only \$1 million (leather); Liberia, \$198.5 million of exports (boats, tires) and \$49.5 million of imports; then, in order of importance: Kenya, \$13.7 million in exports, \$17.5 million in imports; the Ivory Coast, \$7.2 million in exports (textiles, vehicles), \$2.25 million in imports (coffee, cocoa); Ethiopia (purchase of coffee); Tanzania (purchase of copper); Angola, Gabon, Uganda, etc.

It can be seen that Korea's trade with sub-Saharan Africa has thus far been mainly with English-speaking countries--particularly Nigeria, which is the focus of attention of Korean businessmen.

Exports of South Korean products are facilitated by the important role played by KOTRA (Korean Trade Promotion Corporation). This public organization, established in 1962, and analogous to the French Center for Foreign Trade, has permanent representations throughout the world. In Africa, KOTRA has offices in Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland, and Zaire.

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Also, KOTRA organizes numerous fairs abroad. These have included fairs in Tripoli and Cairo in March 1976, in Casablanca in April-May 1976, and in Kinshasa in July 1976. There are similar activities almost annually in a considerable number of African capitals, including Tripoli, Nairobi, and Dakar.

Every year KOTRA also organizes export sales promotion events in Seoul--for example, the Seoul Trade Show.

Finally, the following companies, General Trading Companies, are represented and are very active in the listed countries:

- Nigeria: Daewoo, Hyundai, Bando, Samsung, Hanbaek, Haiti, and Hyosung.
- Ghana: Dongwon, Sajo (fisheries), Haechang.
- Kenya: Daewoo, Sunkung, Hyundai.
- Gabon: Ssanyong (cement plants).
- Liberia: Keumbo (tires).
- Guinea: Daeho, Wonyang (fisheries).
- Ethiopia: Daewoo.

It is worth mentioning the Korean construction companies (public works and construction), which have achieved remarkable results in the past few years in the Middle East (\$12 billion in contracts in 1981; \$3.5 billion in reentry of foreign currency)--we mentioned this previously--and which now have established themselves in Africa, obtaining numerous contracts, specifically in Libya and Nigeria.

--Libya: In 1981, there were 8,000 South Koreans⁵ working on or for construction yards mainly of the Daewoo group.⁶ This figure should double during 1982 because of the numerous important contracts signed. The main ones are as follows: Brak-Shwarif road, \$117 million; Socna-Shwarif road, \$119 million; Ghadames airport, \$62.5 million; a development of 7,000 dwellings, \$347 million; 2,500 schools in Tripolitania, \$526.5 million; development of Ras Lanuf port, \$295 million; and the Misurata steel complex, \$130 million.

Contracts completed by South Korean companies in Libya total \$109 million, and those now underway \$2.708 billion. Hayang Company obtained \$250 million in contracts in 1980. Its goal for 1981 is \$850 million.

In Nigeria, Hayang Construction is building 240 apartments in Sokoto and a hotel for \$168 million. It has a total of \$178 million in contracts thus far. Daewoo Company has reportedly signed a major contract worth \$1.4 billion.

The South Korean construction companies are also beginning to establish themselves in Kenya, Sudan, and Mauritania. In Mauritania, Tai Han company has

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obtained two contracts: one for \$12,135,000 for housing construction, and the other very recently worth \$3.1 million.

Taehwa has contracted for \$21,470,000 of work in Malawi, and Kyungnam Company for \$10.5 million in Cameroon.

However, in spite of the remarkable performance of the Korean economy over the past 20 years, it cannot be overlooked that since 1980 it has been encountering serious difficulties whose causes are both structural and the result of circumstances.

After the assassination of President Pak Chong-hui in October 1979, the year 1980 witnessed serious political unrest, with riots in Kwangju and the repression which followed. Since then, order has been reestablished, and the new President of the Republic, Chun Doo Hwan, elected to the highest office on 25 February 1980 and the representative of the army's aspirations, is firmly maintaining it. It is true that 1980 was a bad year economically, with a negative growth rate of -6.2 percent, and that 1981 did not live up to the announced promises.

Certainly exports, at almost \$21 billion, have reached a very high level, but on the other hand the balance of payments has shown one of the largest deficits ever recorded (\$5.3 billion). The domestic market has shown a slight weakening. Thus, inflation has slowed--one of the rare positive indicators that one can find: at the end of the year it is expected to be 12 percent, compared to 34-44 percent in 1980 and at the beginning of 1981. It is nevertheless true that since 1980, and throughout 1981, the standard of living of salary workers has declined. Public officials admit it. This decline in the purchasing power of the majority of people is not likely to stimulate the domestic market or ease the concern about an economic crisis, which is already admitted. Unemployment, though not high, is increasing and must be taken into consideration. According to official statistics, it has risen to 5.2 percent of the active labor force (15 million).

In summary, the climate of confidence necessary for a recovery has not been established. Investment is more and more limited. Investment in factories and equipment dropped 2.4 percent following the decline of 24.6 percent in 1980. The statistics show that, in general, investment (domestic fixed investment) declined by 12 percent in 1980 and 5.2 percent in 1981--or 17 percent in 2 years. The difficult situation in the public works and construction sector in Korea itself illustrates these difficulties. The difficulties have an even greater impact since large sectors of Korean industry, whose staffs are often insufficiently trained, are using outdated technology, resulting in a sometimes questionable production quality.

Sixth major companies have announced that their annual reports will reveal serious deficits. It is true that the banks have received government instructions to limit the damage by granting moratoriums on payment of interest due. Nonetheless, the financial situation of most of them points to serious cash-flow difficulties.

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State currency reserves have decreased by 7.7 percent, and the foreign debt has increased. An unofficial estimate puts the debt at \$38 billion (57.8 percent of the GNP), which means a debt service rate of 17 percent, considerably higher than official estimates, and makes unrealistic the government's objective of bringing this rate down to 11 percent before the end of the Fifth Plan 1982-1987. The rise in the dollar and in American interest rates has significantly increased the burden of this debt, both for the public and private sectors, and there is no reason to expect a marked improvement in the near future.

Thus the Korean economy, though it is not really on the brink of a general crisis, and though it is able to point to certain strong features (public works in foreign markets, shipyards, and electronics industry), can in fact be seen to be in a clear recession. This was recognized by the new deputy prime minister for planning, Kim Joon Sung, when he said on 7 January 1982 that he "would try to bring the economy of the country out of the long tunnel of the recession in which it has found itself."

In reality, it is a crisis of growth. Korea, which in 25 years has passed from the stage of poverty to become one of the developed countries, now faces the problems which confront industrialized nations.

It is reasonable to believe that the extraordinary qualities of courage and dynamism which the South Koreans have shown thus far will again be demonstrated, and that the current crisis will ultimately be overcome.

Whatever the case, Korea's development in these past two decades is an example for all developing countries. It shows that human qualities--in a country lacking natural wealth, small in area, with severe climatic conditions, and moreover with the need to make a considerable defense effort to face the North Korean threat (37 percent of the budget, 6 percent of the GNP goes to the army)--can prevail over the most difficult conditions.

Work, determination, a sense of nationality and the general interest, and respect for the administration are the real factors in development. This is the lesson that South Korea's recent history offers to the world.

French-South Korean Economic Cooperation Agreement

The French JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 3 March 1982 published the text of the 5-year economic cooperation agreement between France and the Republic of Korea, signed in Seoul on 4 April 1981 and effective the same date. The document lists in an appendix the sectors must involved in economic cooperation: agriculture, animal-raising, and agrofood industry; chemical industry; energy, new forms of energy, and energy conservation; civil engineering; mechanical and electrical engineering; metallurgical and steel industries; tourism, audiovisual techniques; telecommunications; and transport.

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FOOTNOTES

1. The World Bank gave the figure \$1,500 as the GNP per capita of South Korea at the end of 1979. For North Korea (120,500 sq km, 18 million people) the World Bank gave for the same year the figure \$1,130 for GNP per capita.
2. However, the trade balance showed a \$5.3 billion deficit in 1981. This was due to imports from Japan: \$6.3 billion compared to \$3.4 billion in exports; and to fuel imports: \$6.9 billion. The "invisible" balance was also in deficit by \$2 billion. By comparison, Taiwan's exports in 1981 totaled \$22.6 billion, Hong Kong \$21.7 billion, and Singapore \$20.9 billion.
3. However, special mention should be made of small and medium enterprises, which total 27,455 out of a total of 28,809 companies in Korea. These employ 43 percent of the work force (909,000) of Korean industrial and commercial enterprises. Production by small and medium enterprises in 1978 totaled \$12.2 billion out of \$38.3 billion, or 31.9 percent of total industrial production. In 1979, they contributed 35.1 percent of total Korean exports.
4. The Republic of Korea does not have diplomatic relations with South Africa.
5. Korean Air Lines serves Libya once a week with a Seoul-Bahrain-Tripoli route.
6. The Huundai, Samsung, Hayang, and Yuwon groups also cooperate in Libya.

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ANGOLA

DETAILS OF OIL AGREEMENT WITH ITALY PROVIDED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1898, 26 Mar 82 p 866

[Text] On 21 March, Angola and Italy signed the most important oil contract ever concluded between these two countries. It involves the exploration and pumping of an offshore oilfield south of the oil-rich province of Cabinda. Besides AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise], which is the principal partner with 50 percent of the foreign investment, the other companies involved are the French company ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] (25 percent), the Portuguese company PETROGAL [expansion unknown] (10 percent), and the Yugoslav companies INANAFTAGAS and INANAFTAPLIN [expansions unknown] (7.5 percent each). SONANGOL [National Angolan Fuel Company], which has the monopoly over the concessions, will hold a 51-percent interest and the foreign companies 49 percent.

The Angolan offshore oilfield, south of Cabinda, has been divided into 13 sectors, and 4 of them have already been allocated. Negotiations for the allocation of two additional sectors are underway with the companies BRASPETRO [Brazilian Petroleum Corporation] (Brazil) and PETROFINA (Belgium) for Sector 4 and with the IEDC (International Energy Development Corporation--Canada, Sweden, Kuwait) and Hispanoil [Spanish Oil Company] for Sector 7.

AGIP already holds a 15-percent interest in Sector 3, where the principal operator is the French company ELF, which has made two discoveries described as "very important." Angola's major oil partner continues to be the U.S. company Gulf, which operates in Cabinda. In Sector 1, initial operations consisting of seismic studies will get underway in April or May. The first drilling will be completed by December 1982.

AGIP is part of the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] group, which also is involved in other activities in Angola, namely, vocational training (in Nguza petroleum school, in a middle-level petroleum institute, technical assistance to SONANGOL, and the training of mechanics and electricians) and agriculture in the provinces of Benguela (west-central) and Mocamedes (southwest).

Economic and financial cooperation between ENI and Angola likewise is evident in the spheres of shipping and fishing. The Olivetti and Fiat companies also have subsidiaries in the country.

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ANGOLA

MALANJE PROVINCE SELECTED FOR AGRICULTURAL, MARKETING PILOT PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1046

[Text] By virtue of its geographical location and economy, Malanje Province has always been one of Angola's main farming regions for a number of crops--cotton, oleaginous seeds, tubers, fresh fruit and vegetables. That province has been chosen by the authorities in Luanda to carry out a pilot project on "direct marketing."

Malanje Province has three different agricultural sectors.

1. The state sector, which consists of seven state agricultural companies and two state livestock companies. The output of that sector was 3,282 tons in 1979, around 2,000 tons more in 1980 and 9,700 tons in 1981, despite the drought. Last year, poultry farming produced close to 130,000 young chickens and 8,000 eggs (these figures represent the output sold to the population). Hog raising, which was destroyed during the war, is now being rebuilt (two facilities have been rebuilt and the province has around 600 breeding hogs) so as to be able to supply the population later on.
2. The associated sector consists of 29 cooperatives with 3,353 cooperative members and 110 associations with 11,500 members. To improve the assistance provided for that sector, five priority zones have been created. Pilot projects entailing new forms of organization and new working methods are being carried out in these zones (Quizenga, Lombe-Cota, Lutau, Baixa de Cassange and Songo). In each case, preferential treatment is given to different crops (cotton, corn, sweet potatoes, tobacco, rice, cassava and so on). It must be noted that the use of fertilizers has been introduced to improve the yields. Last year's rice crop was 2,000 tons and the corn crop was 4,818 tons (following yields of 1,205 tons in 1979 and 1,973 tons in 1980).
3. The individual sector produced an overall output of 6,347 tons in 1979, 5,917 tons in 1980 and around 10,000 tons in 1981.

But producing is not enough. One still has to sell. The problem of marketing their product was one of the main difficulties encountered by farming circles in the first years after independence. To solve that problem in the Malanje Province, the government decided to establish a two-tier marketing system with central markets and local markets in charge of direct marketing

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operations within the framework of an agency, the Provincial Marketing Commission, which supervises and coordinates commercial operations with the farmers.

Today, there are rural markets all over the province and last year they made it possible to sell 20,000 tons of farming goods. These markets are also where rural families purchase the industrial goods they need to improve their living conditions. Therefore, they counteract the impact of traditional merchants who are often considered to be "exploiters."

After going through a period of "teething troubles," the direct marketing system is now fully accepted by the population.

The outlook for the 1981-1982 farming year is thus somewhat optimistic. In the state sector, however, some figures have had to be readjusted in view of the economic situation. For instance, 2,000 hectares of rice were due to be planted but, in fact, only 1,600 were planted due to delays in the delivery of seeds and the shortage of fuel for tractors as a result of the attack on the refinery of PETRANGOL [Angolan Petroleum Company]. Also, they still had not started planting potatoes and sunflowers at the beginning of February.

In the associated sector, 4,000 hectares are scheduled to be planted; more corn acreage will be planted than in previous years and the area planted with soya will also be greater. But farmers will have to combat an insect that attacks the leaves of the cassava plant causing terrible damage.

Cattle raising will be given a boost by sending to the province 2,000 cows imported from Botswana that will go to a farm of the Malanje Livestock Enterprise.

There are also plans to raise a hardy breed of egg layers and table chickens. These birds will eventually be distributed throughout the farming areas, since this hardy breed does not require specific feeding as do battery chickens.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH PORTUGAL--The official 3-day visit to Angola by Portuguese Foreign Minister Andre Goncalves Pereira, which ended in mid-March, will contribute to reinforcing the ties between the governments of Lisbon and Luanda. The balance of trade between Angola and Portugal currently shows a large surplus in favor of the latter country--Angola's major supplier in the West, ahead of France--and Luanda wants to correct this imbalance by increasing its sales of crude oil [to Portugal] and diversifying its own sources of supplies. This plan has been the subject of an intensive study. First, it was thought that Portuguese purchases of Angolan crude "would not start for a while," on the strength of reports indicating that Angola's order-book for 1982 was filled, and that this matter would only be considered in 1983, depending on the amount of oil pumped. But subsequently, Lopo do Nascimento, Angola's minister for trade and planning, announced that deliveries of Angolan oil to Portugal will start this coming September, on account of an increase in production scheduled to start at that time. Portugal will then appear on the list of preferential buyers, which currently includes the United States, France, Spain, and Brazil. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1898, 26 Mar 82 p 866] COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

RED CROSS ACTIVITIES--The 6-month activity report (September 1981-February 1982) recently issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]--with its biggest mission in the world located in Angola, which was visited at the end of March by Richard Pestalozzi, vice president of the ICRC--emphasizes the massive scale of assistance required by that country even before the latest South African attack. The humanitarian organization operates mostly in the central and southern parts of the country. In the central highlands (provinces of Huambo and Bie), the program of aid to displaced persons, which affected 25,000 people in September, was expanded to 65,000 people in February. In the south, two new offices have opened, one in Huila Province and another in Cunene Province, which is partly occupied by the South Africans. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr p 1046] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH PORTUGAL--"Portugal's membership in the EEC will result in greater cooperation between Portugal and Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa," stated Mario Soares, secretary general of the Socialist Party, on 22 March. Returning from a 4-day visit to Cape Verde, the socialist leader underscored the need for close cooperation between Portugal and its former colony, a move which, according to him, is not in contradiction with Portugal's membership in the EEC. "The lack of natural resources is the major obstacle to the development of Cape Verde, which nonetheless has extraordinary assets: the high intellectual and professional level of the leaders of the PAICV (African Independence Party of Cape Verde)," Mario Soares said. The Portuguese deputy prime minister, Diego Freitas do Amaral, announced on 16 March that in a few months' time Portugal will strengthen its military cooperation with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa. The deputy prime minister, who is also minister of defense, specified that the program of military cooperation with former Portuguese colonies in Africa "is in a way starting to materialize as far as Mozambique is concerned," and that Guinea Bissao "has already made us some proposals on that subject." Freitas do Amaral said that this cooperation, currently taking place under the auspices of the Armed Forces General Staff, will eventually fall within the province of the Ministry of Defense. The deputy prime minister, who received the defense minister of Cape Verde, Honorio Chantre, also made a point of underlining his government's keen interest in military cooperation with the government in Praia. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1898, 26 Mar 82 p 848] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS--Bishop Paulino Evora of Cape Verde said in Lisbon on 8 March that in his country the church is living under "mission conditions" characterized by a shortage of missionary and lay personnel and by "close dependence on other sister churches from Europe and America." Today, there are 40 priests in Cape Verde for a population of some 300,000 inhabitants, 90 percent of whom are Catholics, divided into 30 parishes. There is a great shortage of personnel, and the situation is compounded by the isolation of the various islands that form the archipelago," he said. On the subject of relations between the church and the Cape Verde Government, the bishop noted the secular nature of the state and recalled that since 1976, divorce has been recognized for marriages in the church. "The state does not recognize church marriages, and a growing number of Catholics are getting married in the register's office," he added. Monsig-Evora, who is 50 and was appointed bishop in 1975, is the first bishop of Cape

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Verde to be born in the archipelago. While in Portugal he visited a community of some 40,000 Cape Verdians, most of whom are living in the Lisbon area.
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GHANA

AMBASSADOR IN PARIS DENIES HUMAN RIGHTS ACCUSATIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1898, 26 Mar 82 p 854

[Text] In response to an article by our contributor Jacques Latremoliere which appeared in MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS on 5 March under the heading "Jerry Rawlings' Choice," we have received a letter from Joseph Quao Cleland, the Ghanaian ambassador in Paris, which we are happy to reprint:

"The gift brought to Ghana by a Libyan delegation on 10 January 1982 as a token of solidarity with our country consisted only of food and drugs. The food was distributed as rations among soldiers, while the drugs were divided among several hospitals in Ghana. Any suggestion to the contrary is unfortunate and biased.

"Reports that Addae Amoaka, a prominent figure in the now-banned National People's Party, has been executed are untrue and without basis. As a matter of fact, Addae Amoako is now living in London as a refugee. A few weeks ago he was actually interviewed by the BBC, and therefore he could not have been executed.

"I must also point out that it is the acknowledged policy of the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] not to execute anybody for political reasons. The new government is in favor of holding fair and public trials and is very scrupulous in the observance of basic human rights. You might be interested to know that 16 military men--4 soldiers and 12 of other ranks--were killed on the night of 31 December. Later, these men were buried with full military honors.

"To suggest that the military coup d'etat of 31 December which brought Air Force Lieutenant Rawlings back to power was instigated by some specific ethnic group is outrageous and misleading. It amounts to a scheme hatched by enemies of Ghana to sow discord and disunity in our determined effort to achieve a better society based on responsibility and justice."

We take full note of the points made by the ambassador and are particularly pleased to hear that Addae Amoako was not executed and is currently living in London. On the other hand, we recall that our contributor had questioned the possibility that the coup had been instigated by "a special ethnic group." When he mentioned that theory, he actually said it nothing but "a cock-and-bull story."

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GHANA

INCREASED DEFICIT IN TRADE WITH FRANCE REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1898, 26 Mar 82 p 854

[Text] In 1981, commercial exchanges between France and Ghana registered a sharp increase in the trade imbalance to the disadvantage of Ghana.

According to French statistics, the deficit jumped by 238 percent compared to the previous year, from 14.6 million to 49.4 million francs, whereas between 1979 and 1980 it had increased only 24.7 percent--from 11.7 million to 14.6 million francs.

On the French side, the situation is due to a decline in purchases of cocoa and an increase in sales of food products, mostly sugar.

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
Imports	65.7	96.6	78.5
Imports of cocoa	60	84	73.4
Exports	77.4	111.2	127.9
Exports of sugar	15	40.5	64.6
Exports of various vehicles	13.7	13.8	10.4
Balance	11.7	14.6	49.4

It should be noted that French sales of motor vehicles, which had remained steady during 1979 and 1980, went into a sharp decline in 1981 as a result of severe import restrictions imposed by the former regime of Dr Limann.

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GHANA

BRIEFS

INFLATION STATISTICS--According to the Central Statistical Board, prices in Ghana registered an overall increase of 109.9 percent between November 1980 and November 1981. Over a period of a month, from October to November last year, prices went up by 3.5 percent. Only in the country's capital was the overall increase for 1981 98.8 percent. In 2 years, prices have more than tripled (up 203.9 percent compared with the end of November 1979). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1030] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

FARMERS ASSOCIATION--Large-holding farmers in Ghana have founded an association, the Ghana Commercial Farmers Association (GCFA), to boost production. The association is headed by Prof A. C. Kuma of Ameyi Farms. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1901, 16 Apr 82 p 1030] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

VALCO AGREEMENT UNDER REVIEW--Ghana's Provisional National Defense Council has announced its intention to review the existing agreement between the Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO) and Kaiser Aluminium involving the management and running of the Tema foundry. The council's purpose is to have the foreign company make a greater contribution to the national interests in its partnership with the Ghanaian company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1898, 26 Mar 82 p 854] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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MOZAMBIQUE

RELEASED BRITON CITES WELL-ORGANIZED NRM

PM11359 London THE GUARDIAN in English 29 May 82 p 7

[Dispatch from John Borrell: "Mozambique Resistance 'Is Well Armed and Fed'"]

[Text] Harare, Zimbabwe--The Mozambique National Resistance, which is engaged in an increasingly bitter struggle against President Machel's Frelimo government appears to be better armed and supplied than official reports suggest.

According to Mr John Burlison, the British zoologist released this week after 5 months as a prisoner of the MNR, the guerrillas are well armed and fed, and can move with comparative ease over large areas of central Mozambique.

Mr Burlison, aged 28, said yesterday, that he had counted about 1,000 guerrillas at camps where he had been held prisoner. All were armed with Soviet-made AK.47 assault rifles, and mortars. Landmines and machine guns were in evidence. Several times the guerrillas returned to camp with weapons captured in engagements with Mozambican troops. Prisoners had also been brought back.

At the base camp where he spent most of the 5 months there were thatched huts and the guerrillas did not seem unduly concerned about the possibility of attacks by government forces. Food was supplied by local villagers and, although he could not establish whether they did so willingly, or under duress, Mr Burlison said the maize meal, vegetables and meat were plentiful.

"We ate three meals a day and beef or goat meat was served almost every evening," he said. "I actually put on weight in the camps."

He said the guerrillas moved about freely during daylight, and on one occasion he was accompanied by 300 men on a march between two camps.

Discipline and organisation in the camps was good, although he was once told of prisoners being shot for trying to escape. "I heard the shots but didn't actually see anything myself."

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Mr Burlison said he saw nothing to connect the guerrilla movement with South Africa or any other outside power. A few old parachutes were in evidence in one of the camps. But there were no markings on them.

The MRN is generally thought to be backed by South Africa. Documents captured recently by Mozambican troops reinforced Maputo's claims that Pretoria is involved.

However, Mr Burlison's observations while a prisoner do not tally with the official line from Maputo that the movement has a rag-tag army, which is continually being routed by government forces.

Mr Burlison who was abducted in the Gorongosa game reserve, where he worked, on 17 December, estimates that he was marched a total of 500 miles during his time with the guerrillas.

He said he had been well-treated and had even been provided with anti-malaria pills on a regular basis. When a sore went septic on a march he was given an injection of penicillin.

The zoologist flies back to Britain today and plans to visit his family in Stokton-on-Tees.

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

SOLAR ENERGY RESOURCE--The chairman of Total Industry, Ltd. of Nigeria announced at the recent dedication of a lubricants factory in Koko, Bendel state, that his company had reached an agreement with the University of Lagos and the Solar Energy Society of Nigeria for a research program into industrial uses of solar energy. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1899, 2 Apr 82 p 912] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9920

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SOUTH AFRICA

EFFECTS OF APARTHEID EXAMINED

Paris PROJET in French No 165, May 82 pp 536-546

[Article by Pierre Haski: "South Africa: Apartheid in the Face of Resistance"]

[Text] Every year on 16 December, the gap separating the Whites from the Blacks in South Africa grows wider than ever. On that day, each community celebrates in its own fashion a page in the tormented history of the country: the battle of Blood River, which, in 1838 in northern Natal Province, saw the defeat of the Zulus, led by their Chief Dingaan, by the Boers Voortrekkers of Andries Pretorius.

For the Afrikaners, descendants of the Boers, that day, called the "Day of the Covenant," celebrates the "meeting with God," who alone made the victory over the Zulus possible. Pretorius had sworn to dedicate the day to the glory of God if he won the victory. His descendants still honor his vow. Every year, the Afrikaners go en masse to the battlefield where a memorial has been erected, along with a massive monument built to the glory of the Boers pioneers, the Voortrekker Monument, not far from Pretoria. For the occasion, the little White girls are dressed in costumes of the last century, with ribbons and long frocks, under the stern watch of the life-size statues of the Boer warriors. A large fresco inside retells the Boer epic, with battle scenes that depict the Zulus, hate on their faces, chasing White women and children with spears.

A few kilometers away from the monument, a totally different atmosphere reigns. In Soweto, the vast Black ghetto of 1.5 million inhabitants in southwestern Johannesburg, it is not the Day of the Covenant, but Dingaan Day that is celebrated. Thousands of Africans gather together every year in the big Catholic Regina Mundi Church in Soweto to swear to "continue the fight" against White domination and, in a sense, avenge the memory of the great Dingaan. At every gathering, many Black churchmen, such as Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary general of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), and a few White priests also, come to express their support.

Now, 144 years after Blood River, South Africa is far from having found its stability. On the contrary, it remains an explosive country, whose upheavals are felt throughout the entire South African subcontinent and far beyond.

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Apartheid: Scientific Racism

The facts are well-known: With a total population of over 28 million inhabitants, South Africa remains under the exclusive domination of the 4.5 million Whites. Some 2.5 million Coloreds, 800,000 Indians and 20 million Africans remain second-class citizens in their own country.

The "epidermic" racism of the English, who governed the South African Union from the time of its creation in 1910 (end of the Boer War) until 1948, was followed by the "scientific" discrimination of the Afrikaners. On that date, in fact, the Afrikaners, who represent some 60 percent of the Whites, overcame their divisions and barely won a victory in the legislative elections -- reserved for the Whites. General Smuts, prime minister and hero of the fight against the Nazis, was beaten by those he had had to intern during the war for sympathies toward the Axis! Among them was a future prime minister, Balthazar John Vorster. One then witnessed the birth of apartheid; whose very name implies the notion of separation. The Afrikaners in power would try to separate everything. To each his own, but with the Whites at the top! It was racism, but also the establishment of an overall, planned system for the exploitation of an abundant labor force.

The ideological foundations of apartheid are simple. The doctrine is based on an absolute belief in the superiority of the White race, accompanied by a religious conviction according to which the Afrikaners make up a "chosen people" responsible for leading this part of the Black continent. Whence the insistence on the necessary preservation of the "identity" of the Afrikaners and the determination not to "mix," not with the English-speaking Whites any more than with the Blacks. Despite the anti-Semitism in which the Afrikaners were bathed after the war, one finds in many of their writings comparisons with the place of Israel in the Arab world.

The biblical justifications of the supporters of apartheid are numerous and find fierce defenders in the three reformed Dutch churches that have pushed their conviction about White superiority and the need to separate men to the point of setting up different churches for each population group. The National Socialism that fascinated the Afrikaners during the 1930's and 1940's was followed by the "national Christianity" of the government emerging from the 1948 elections. Only the reformed Dutch churches, however, give their support and backing to the regime. The other Christian churches, on the contrary, have violently condemned the racist system.

As early as 1948, the laws of apartheid followed one another in rapid succession: 1948, a ban on interracial marriages; 1950, a ban on sexual relations between the races; 1950, the Group Areas Act, strengthening residential segregation; 1950 again, the Population Registration Act, institutionalizing racial classification; 1953, the codification of apartheid in public places; 1955, extension of the code to transportation; and 1959, its extension to the universities.

In a 529-page work reviewing all laws containing references to race, a liberal private institution, the South African Institute of Race Relations, notes:

"While the measures introduced before 1948 were of an ad hoc nature, the legislative program subsequently introduced followed a much more clearly defined law aimed at implementing the racial policy of the government of the National Party."¹

Theory and Practice of Segregation

The real theoretician of apartheid was the third nationalist prime minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, named in 1958 and assassinated 8 years later. Verwoerd's doctrine is clear: Regarding the Africans, every ethnic group (there are nine main ones) must be considered as a "national unit" with its own territory, where it will enjoy political rights that may go as far as sovereignty, with the Whites maintaining their control over the rest of the country. Africans residing in the "White zones" are considered to be migrant workers and their number should decrease. There are consequently no South African citizens with black skin. The Coloreds and Indians will be given the possibility of managing their administration, while being subordinate to the central White Parliament. In order to show the path to follow in order to reduce the number of Blacks in the "White zones," the wife of the prime minister has always refused to accept Black domestics!

Verwoerd's doctrine was scrupulously applied. Residential segregation was applied at the cost of hundreds of thousands of persons having to be displaced. Entire districts, "nonwhite" enclaves such as Sophiatown (Africans) in Johannesburg or District Six (Coloreds) in the Cape, were razed and their inhabitants sent to the outlying areas of the cities. Verwoerd's successors nevertheless managed to reduce -- on paper -- the Black population of South Africa by over 8 million by giving them citizenship of "rump states" whose legal existence is recognized only by Pretoria. These former Bantustans (as they were once called), made "independent," live only off Pretoria's subsidies and the majority of their theoretical population lives permanently in the so-called White zones. Whether or not they are independent, the nine Bantustans -- with a total of some 13 percent of South Africa's area -- nevertheless perfectly fulfill their role as a reservoir of labor and real "dying places" where thousands of Blacks no longer wanted in the White zones are pushed. We visited Nondweni in northern Natal, on the edge of the Kwazulu bantustan, a resettlement camp where every day, the Blacks pushed out of the White zones are brought by truck and where no economic activity was possible. Having visited one of these camps in eastern Cape Province, Bishop Tutu said he was shocked to see human beings treated "like sacks of potatoes."

Today, the government goes abroad claiming that "apartheid is dead" (according to Minister of Foreign Affairs Pieter-Koornhof before the National Press Club in Washington in 1980). But it makes reference to what has been called "petty apartheid": the segregation of public benches, elevators, luxury hotels. This discrimination, the most obvious and most shocking, has in fact been toned down, even if it has not totally disappeared (the restaurant at the international airport of Johannesburg has been integrated, but not that of domestic flights! Likewise, theaters are open to everyone, but not movie houses). The fact remains that the changes made remain insignificant to the great majority of the Blacks, who, in their daily lives, are above all marked by the ban on

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living where they want, the lack of any freedom to move about in the country and the requirement to carry a pass stipulating the place of work and residence, the inequality of wages for equal work, the absence of any political rights and other basic rights such as freedom of expression, without mentioning an omnipresent, merciless repression.

Legalized Repression

Along with this great design, the South African Government stepped up its repressive legislation enabling it to closely control the population and prevent any dissent from apartheid. South Africa now has a hallucinating arsenal of laws, many of which -- ironically enough -- are comparable to those of the Soviet Union, such as banishment or restrictions on movement within the country. If, in Argentina, one "disappears" without leaving a trace, there exists, in South Africa, a law making it possible to disappear "legally": the law on terrorism, section 6 (the Terrorism Act), authorizing secret detention without possibility of contact with one's family or a lawyer, for an indefinite period of time. Several thousand persons have gone through the hands of the police for varying lengths of time in recent years. It was during his detention under such conditions that White trade unionist Neil Aggett, involved in the independent Black trade union movement, met death in February 1982: a suicide, according to authorities. For South African jurist John Dugard, on the other hand, "section 6 produces an environment of intimidation equivalent to torture."

The South African Government has repeatedly shown its determination to use every possible means to maintain the status quo. The repression at the beginning of the 1960's, with the massacre of 62 Black demonstrators in Sharpeville and the imprisonment of the main Black leaders, such as Nelson Mandela (still in prison) and Robert Sobukwe (now deceased), was followed by a long silence. The international environment lent itself to it: Portuguese order still reigned supreme in neighboring Angola and Mozambique, while Rhodesia was still in "good hands."

Awakening of Resistance

It would be necessary to wait until 1975, with the "carnation revolution" in Lisbon and the collapse of the Portuguese empire, to witness the true awakening of resistance to apartheid. The first street demonstration in several years took place in June 1975 in Durban, in support of the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) of Samora Machel being set up in Lourenco Marques (now Maputo), the favorite resort place of White South Africans. It was no accident that the Soweto riots broke out in June 1976: A few months previously, the South African Army had had to withdraw from Angola without being able to prevent the victory of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) of Agostinho Neto, supported by the Cubans. The psychological impact of the failure on Black opinion was considerable.

June 1976: The explosion of anger of the Black youth of Soweto, followed like a train of powder during the entire southern winter throughout the country, marked a turning point. To the young unarmed demonstrators protesting against the introduction of Afrikaans in their schools and more generally, demanding

an end to separate "Bantu education," Pretoria responded with gunfire. In a matter of weeks, there were over 600 dead, most from bullets. Several thousand young Blacks then went into exile and to guerrilla training camps in Angola and Tanzania.

The government of John Vorster had hoped that by striking hard, it would obtain 15 years of calm, as in 1960. But the international context had changed dramatically. For the first time, the South African bastion has common borders with militant Black Africa: Mozambique, facing the Transvaal, and Angola, facing Namibia.² The guerrilla movements in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Namibia thus had rear bases and their activities were to experience a sharp increase.

Black Consciousness

Since 1976, South Africa has had no rest. It is not necessarily a matter of bloody revolts, which alone make the front page of foreign newspapers, but of a slow, sure rise of the resistance. June 1976 made it possible to discover a new generation of antiapartheid militants, who did not know the multi-racial struggles of the 1950's and who had scarcely had any contact with traditional organizations. This new generation is that of "Black consciousness," a philosophy whose "father," Steve Biko, died at the age of 30 in the hands of the police, in September 1977. Biko was the founder of a movement of Black students, SASO [South African Students Organization], born of a split in the liberal, multiracial student union, NUSAS [National Union of South African Students]. It rejected the paternalism of the White liberals and believed that Blacks should assert their identity and free themselves before thinking about cooperating with the Whites. It defined its attitude as follows: "Being Black is not a question of skin color. It is the reflection of a mental attitude. Simply by describing yourself as Black, you commit yourself to the path of emancipation. You pledge to fight all forces seeking to use your blackness [*negritude*] as a sign of submission."³ Consequently, today, the young Coloreds and Indians always describe themselves as Black, whatever the color of their skin. Likewise, it was an Indian woman, sociologist Fatima Meer, now "banished," who was president of the Federation of Black Women, one of the many organizations following Biko's philosophy. Essentially nonviolent, this philosophy was betting on the growing awareness of the African, Colored and Indian population as a means of liberation. The Black consciousness had a considerable impact in South Africa, particularly through the churches.

John Vorster halted its development in October 1977, one month after the death of Steve Biko, by banning 18 organizations and newspapers close to the Black consciousness, including the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, headed by an Afrikaner, Beyers Naude, and by imprisoning their leaders. He thus destroyed the last hopes of peaceful change which young Blacks still harbored, but at the same time, rendered an immense service to an organization that was certainly more dangerous to him: the African National Congress (ANC).

African National Congress

Born in 1912, the first modern political organization on the Black continent, the ANC was decimated in 1962-1963. Its main leader, Nelson Mandela, has

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rotted in the Robben Island Penitentiary, off the Cape, since that time and his military wing, the Umkhonto We Sizwe (the nation's spearhead) had long been paralyzed by the "protective glaze" of the Portuguese empire and "rebel" Ian Smith. Since 1975, the ANC has experienced a profound revival. Following the Soweto riots, the exiled president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, told us: "The movement was not planned by the ANC." But he added that despite its disagreements with the slogans of young people, such as "Black Power," the ANC being for the establishment of a nonracial society, their paths would cross one day.⁴ He was right and since the 1977 repression, the ANC has come to the forefront as the main opposition force, both inside and outside South Africa.

One significant fact: Steve Biko's heirs, particularly his former right arm, Barney Pityana, are now all in the ranks of the ANC, despite their initial reticence because of the pro-Soviet South African Communist Party (SACP) within the old nationalist movement.⁵ This influx of "new blood" into the ANC cannot fail to influence the very nature of the organization. Several generations and factions coexist, not without difficulty, but they make the ANC the inevitable interlocutor of the government in Pretoria on the day -- probably still far ahead -- when negotiations will have to be initiated between Whites and Blacks.

The ANC is now present on all fronts of the antiapartheid struggle, directly or indirectly. Militarily speaking, without falling into the trap of terrorism, it has in recent years waged a number of spectacular actions against well-chosen targets, which has had a profound psychological impact. Politically speaking, the ANC undeniably enjoys the support of a majority of the Blacks, as proved by the great popularity of Nelson Mandela despite his 17 years in prison, and even of a small minority of Whites, Marxist but Christian as well.

Trade Union Movement

However, facing the South African military might, unequalled on the continent, no one in the liberation movement thinks about bringing down the government by bombs or by "liberating" rural areas, as in Zimbabwe or Mozambique. Since South Africa is highly industrialized, one of the regime's weaknesses has to do with its extreme dependency on Black labor. It was therefore not by accident that a particularly militant Black trade union movement has developed in recent years, especially since the major strikes in Durban in 1973. The number of work stoppages has greatly increased in the past 2 years. The automobile industry, concentrated in Port Elizabeth, was paralyzed by movements for demands. These movements are generally actively relayed in compounds reserved for Blacks. In the Cape, one strike of Black slaughterhouse workers resulted in a long boycott of meat by the African and Colored communities.

Mainly existing in the major enterprises of industrial centers such as Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, East London or the Cape, this trade union movement was hard hit by repression at the end of 1981. They avoid encroaching on the political domain, precisely in order not to leave themselves open to repression, and the independent Black trade unions consider themselves to be one of the components of the movement to fight apartheid. When the leader of the Ford workers, Thozamile Botha, a Black namesake of the prime minister who was arrested and then banished by the government, fled from South Africa last year,

he immediately joined the ANC! Despite its divisions and the pressures applied to it, the young Black trade union movement is one of the main threats to the regime of apartheid in the years to come.

Splits Among Whites

This uninterrupted rise of the resistance has divided the White minority, revealing splits between English-speakers and Afrikaners as well as within the latter community. The "White tribe" of South Africa is far from monolithic. Between English- and Afrikaans-speaking Whites, there is a world of incomprehension and distrust difficult to eradicate. Each has its schools, its universities, newspapers and even churches. The former group remains liberal, in the English sense of the term, and rejects racial discrimination, even if basically, they would be little inclined to give up their privileges. Their main political party, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), although headed by a brilliant Afrikaner intellectual, Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, mainly recruits its backers in the smarter districts of Johannesburg and the Cape. Its main financial supporter is none other than Harry Oppenheimer, the gold and diamond magnate, chairman of the board of the Anglo-American Corporation and of De Beers. The PFP, antiapartheid even if it does not go so far as to demand universal suffrage, constitutes the "official opposition" in the central Parliament in the Cape, with 27 out of 177 deputies.

Opposite it, the National Party, in power since 1948, now scarcely constitutes the monolith it has long been. An initial split of the right in 1970, led by the former minister of posts and telecommunications -- the man who was opposed to the introduction of television out of fear of seeing communism infiltrate the country by means of the tiny screen -- was skillfully contained by John Vorster, then prime minister. But in recent years, a serious split has resurfaced within the party between the *verligte* (enlightened) and *verkrampste* (old-fashioned) wings. Internal confrontations on the degree of reform to be introduced into the system of apartheid have just come to a conclusion with the expulsion of the extreme right from the party at the beginning of March and the formation of a new pole of attraction within the Afrikaners, on the right of the National Party.

This conservative party of South Africa was set up by the former minister of state administration, Andries Treurnicht, former pastor in the Dutch Reformed Church, who is thus challenging Prime Minister Pieter Botha, accused of betraying Verwoerd's ideals. A significant fact, at the meeting to launch this party on 20 March in Pretoria, amidst a truly neofascist atmosphere, the audience of over 7,000 persons was mainly made up of workers and "lower-class" Whites. Likewise, Treurnicht obtained the rallying of Connie Mulder, former minister of information in disgrace, recently overwhelmingly elected over the retiring mayor of the National Party, in the Afrikaner workers district of Randfontein, near Johannesburg.

This split in the National Party undeniably expresses the sociological evolution of the Afrikaners. At the beginning of the century, the latter constituted a population of small farmers and workers in direct competition with Black labor. From 75 percent rural Afrikaners in 1911, the figure is now

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85 percent city dwellers. In the economic field, the share of the Afrikaners in the private sector was only 9.8 percent in 1948, but it has risen to over 25 percent. One must now reckon with Afrikaner capital: The third-ranking private bank in South Africa, the Volkskas (set up in the 1930's by an Afrikaner secret society, the Broederbond), and the second-ranking mining firm, General Mining, are controlled by Afrikaners. In the 1920's, Afrikaner workers invented a personage, Oggenheimer, inspired by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, founder of an industrial and mining empire, to symbolize English capitalism. Today, the Afrikaner owners of General Mining sit alongside Harry Oppenheimer on the board of directors of the Mining Chamber! Even better, in 1979, both English- and Afrikaans-speaking employers broke, with the complicity of the Botha government, a general strike of White workers -- made up of 95 percent Afrikaners -- set off by an extremist racist union to block the social advancement of Black miners.

Era of the Managers: Adapt or Die

Pieter Botha embodies, despite his past as a party hack, this new generation of Afrikaner managers, formed both in the private as well as the important public sector, prompt to sacrifice ideology to the needs of profitability. Indeed, apartheid is not "profitable" in its original form, as Oppenheimer has tried to demonstrate for years. Industry is now suffering from a scarcity of skilled labor. There are no longer enough Whites and the rules of segregation have prevented the training of Black apprentices! By the year 2000, 80 percent of the work force will be Black and there will be 2 million Blacks in the secondary schools, compared with 300,000 Whites. Botha, advised by business circles and, for different reasons, by army chiefs, wants to be a reformist or rather, a modernist. Without totally giving up apartheid, which is the maintenance of White domination, he is willing to make modifications in the system which his rightist opponents reject. "Adapt or die": This has been Botha's slogan for 2 years, but his Afrikaner voters have not followed him. In the 1981 legislative elections, therefore, before the split in the National Party, the HNP [Herstigte Nasionale Party], the party of the extreme right, tripled its votes, gaining a third of all Afrikaner voters.

It is true that the prime minister has never truly presented any precise program. While he has taken a certain number of measures aimed at encouraging the emergence of a Black petty bourgeoisie, he has always been vague on the political level. He now speaks of "sharing power" with the Colored and Indians, but at the same time, he assures people that the Whites are in no way giving up their leadership position. At any rate, he excludes any association of the African majority with management of the country's affairs, deeming that its fate is sealed by the Bantustans made "independent," such as the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Freed of his right wing, will Botha be bolder? A first test will be his reaction to the proposals recently made by a "moderate" Black leader, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, "prime minister" of the Kwazulu Bantustan, who, rejecting the independence of his territory, put together a formula for the sharing of power between Whites and Blacks on the scale of Natal Province.

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For the time being, Botha has enjoyed the support of business circles for implementing his reformist policy. But he still has to prove his credibility and some fear that he may try to check reforms in order to try to recover part of the Afrikaners tempted by the extreme right. The traditional structures of Afrikanerdom (Dutch reformed churches, cultural associations, Broederbond, and so on) are stepping up pressure on the prime minister in order to solidify Afrikaner ranks. In their eyes, nothing justifies the division of the Volk.

As for the Blacks, they follow conflicts within the White minority with little interest, believing that whether "enlightened" or "old-fashioned," apartheid will not disappear as a result of the good will of those in power.

Economic Giant Supported by the West

The fact is that South Africa is not Rhodesia or Mozambique. The White population is large (1 out of 5, compared with 1 out of 16 in Rhodesia) and above all, its economic and military might is much greater. It suffices to recall that South Africa is the world's largest producer of gold (58 percent of total world production), platinum, vanadium and chrome, the second-ranking producer of manganese, the third-ranking producer of diamonds and asbestos and the third-ranking producer of uranium in the Western world, without counting its production and large reserves of coal, iron ore, copper, zinc, nickel, silver, and so on. Only oil is lacking, but Pretoria has partially gotten around the difficulty by producing synthetic oil from the liquefaction of coal!

Despite the serious current recession, partially due to the drop in the price of gold (\$850 an ounce 2 years ago; \$330 in March 1982) and diamonds and to the drop in the demand for ores in the West, the South African economy is a giant on the continent. South Africans have nevertheless just bitterly noted that, like just another Third World country, they are vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices of raw materials. The 1982-1983 budget provides only \$800 million in revenue from the gold mines, compared with over \$2 billion in 1981-1982. After a period of strong growth (8 percent in 1980), South Africa is now in a lasting recession. Scarcely 1 percent growth is expected in the GNP this year and the figure will be even smaller next year. This situation deals a harsh blow to the efforts of South African leaders to reach a maximum level of autarchy. The current need to borrow on the international market and to attract foreign capital, highly sensitive to political risk, greatly affects this strategy of Pretoria. Within such a context, internal political choices hang heavy and the prime minister must make difficult decisions in an unfavorable economic setting.

In addition, South African military might, which is accompanied by an important local weapons industry, remains without equal in the southern Sahara. Pretoria was hit in October 1977 by an embargo of the UN Security Council on arms shipments. But this measure came too late to affect South Africa. Thanks to the purchase of many patents (particularly French), South Africa produces armored cars, all kinds of weapons -- even the equivalent of the Soviet "Stalin organs" (multiple rocket launchers) -- including the Mirage F-1 frame. What it does not manufacture, South Africa always finds ways of obtaining through other means: The TIMES of London recently revealed that Israel was helping

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Pretoria by supplying technicians and spare parts for the maintenance of its Mirage-type fighter planes.

These few facts largely explain the Western support heretofore enjoyed by the regime of apartheid, despite the moral condemnation it has aroused throughout the world. For both economic and strategic reasons (the "Cape route," control of ores, and so on), the West has mainly shut its eyes to the system of segregation and exploitation. Even the socialist government of France has scarcely acted during its first year in power to modify the nature of French-South African relations. Europe has been content to draft a code of conduct -- optional -- for subsidiaries of European multinational companies investing in the country with rapid profits.

But it is mainly to the United States that one must turn. Washington now has the greatest influence, politically and economically, in Pretoria and remains, in the eyes of South African leaders, the "leader of the Free World." Ronald Reagan's coming to power delighted the White South Africans, upset by Carter's moralizing. They have not been disappointed. Washington is lifting, one after another, the restrictions imposed by the preceding administration, such as, for example, the delivery to South Africa of sophisticated computers that can be used for defense or scientific research, or the delivery of non-military equipment to the army (with weapons remaining subject to the UN embargo imposed in 1977).

Backed by this American green light, granted in the name of the principle of the containment of communism throughout the world, South Africa has embarked upon an all-points strategy of destabilizing the regimes in neighboring countries. Angola is undergoing the main assaults, out of all proportion to the situation in previous years. The southern region of the country is systematically invaded by veritable armadas, to the shocking indifference of the rest of the world. Hundreds of thousands of persons have fled their areas, which have been turned into a no man's land. In Mozambique, Pretoria is encouraging and arming a "resistance movement" opposed to the regime of Samora Machel.

It is as if Pretoria had opted for the policy of the worst, preferring to deliver its neighbors over to Soviet "protection" in order to arouse a clearer American commitment in its behalf. How else is one to interpret the constant attacks in Angola, when that country has stepped up its gestures of openness, even to the United States (whose Gulf Oil company continues to work Angolan oil as casually as can be) and brings all its weight to bear on the SWAPO guerrilla soldiers, to which it gives asylum, on behalf of a negotiated settlement in Namibia?

Nothing of what the South African regime has undertaken at home or abroad in recent years has unprimed the explosive climate reigning in the southern part of the African Continent. If the rest of the world continues to stand idly by, while profiting from maintenance of the status quo, then the explosion will not be long in coming, with incalculable consequences for the peoples in the region and far beyond as well.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa, 1948-1976," by Muriel Horrell, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1978.
2. Formerly a German colony in Southwest Africa, Namibia was entrusted to the South African Union as a mandate by the League of Nations in 1920. Despite revocation of the mandate by the United Nations, heir to the League, South Africa continues its occupation of Namibia, a territory rich in diamonds and uranium. International negotiations have been bogged down for years because of Pretoria's intransigence.
3. A collection of texts by Steve Biko was published under the title: "Steve Biko: I Write What I Like," by an Anglican priest of Irish descent, Aelred Stubbs, who had become his friend. Father Stubbs, kicked out of South Africa in 1977, also traces in the book a portrait of the founder of Black consciousness under the title, "Martyr of Hope," Editions The Bowerdan Press, London, 1978.
4. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 4 October 1976.
5. LIBERATION, 9 January 1982.

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SOUTH AFRICA

ZULU CHIEF 'DISILLUSIONED' WITH P. BOTHA

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[Report on interview with Chief Minister of kwaZulu Chief Gotsha Buthelezi by Michael Hornsby--date, place not given]

[Text] Buthelezi Ingwavuma--Polarization between Black and White in South Africa has "never been worse than it is now," according to Chief Gatscha Buthelezi, the leader of the country's six million Zulus.

He also now thinks that Mr P. W. Botha, the prime minister, is incapable of being "a reformer outside the four corners of apartheid."

In a recent interview with THE TIMES, Chief Buthelezi, who is chief minister of kwaZulu homeland where more than three million Zulus live, said his disappointment was all the greater because he had been among those who had been impressed by Mr Botha's promises of reform when he took office three and a half years ago.

"When he took office and expressed his determination to work not only for Whites but also to work for Black people, I was impressed, and I said to my people that this man must be given a chance because he could not be expected to undo the damage of so many generations at the stroke of a pen."

Chief Buthelezi is now convinced those hopes were misplaced. He was particularly disillusioned by Mr Botha's apparent determination to press ahead with proposals to give the franchise to Coloureds (those of mixed race) and Asians (mainly Indians) at the expense of the African three-quarters of the population, who would be left to exercise such political rights as the process in the scattered homelands.

Calling the proposal "a real monstrosity," Chief Buthelezi warned Coloureds and Asians that if they were seen to be "in cahoots with the ruling White minority in this country they would become as much a target of Black hatred and resentment as Whites," which could only complicate the racial conflict.

Earlier this year the multiracial Buthelezi Commission, set up by the kwaZulu legislative assembly, offered an alternative constitutional model with its proposal for merging kwaZulu and the Province of Natal into a racially-integrated regional administration with universal franchise, in which Whites would be protected by a minority veto.

Chief Buthelezi said that this was as far as he could go to accommodate Whites without losing credibility among his own people. The scheme has been warmly supported by the (White) opposition Progressive Federal Party, but was curtly rejected by the ruling National Party which refused even to give evidence to the commission.

Another blow to Chief Buthelezi has been the discovery of plans by the government to cede part of kwaZulu and the whole of the Swazi homeland of kaNgwane to Swaziland, apparently in an attempt to buy Swaziland's friendship and to deprive some 750,000 local Swazis of their South African citizenship.

If the cession of kwaZulu territory is carried out there seems little doubt it would mark a Rubicon in Chief Buthelezi's relations with Pretoria.

Arguably, he is the only Black leader who could still hope to negotiate a bloodless political compromise with the ruling White elite and retain sufficient popular legitimacy to make it stick.

But, while Chief Buthelezi still remains unassailable in Natal and kwaZulu, opinion surveys show that in other parts of the country he has fallen well behind the imprisoned leaders of the ANC as the main symbol of Black resistance to apartheid.

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